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Summary 
The security of natural gas supply is an important issue for all EU countries due to the 
region’s heavy dependence on imported supply sources and in light of energy demand for 
gas that is continuously increasing. Discussions have emphasised strategies for securing the 
supply at the macro level, e.g. diversification in supply sources, increase in storage capacity, 
etc. By contrast, consumers’ demand for the reliability of gas supply is rarely investigated. 
Hence this study was conducted to examine the economic implications associated with the 
security of gas supply directly to domestic consumers. Based on the choice experiment 
approach, household surveys were conducted in France, Italy and the UK. The results 
confirmed that the degree of the economic impact of a disruption of gas supply to domestic 
consumers was a function of the duration of a supply disruption and the season in which a 
supply cut would take place, as well as other preferences of consumers. The willingness to 
pay to secure per unit of gas consumption, or alternatively the costs of gas unsupplied, was 
estimated at between €2.65/cubic metre and €41.48/cubic metre across three different 
European countries. 
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The security of natural gas supply is an important issue for all EU countries due to the region’s 
heavy dependence on imported supply sources and in light of energy demand for gas that is 
continuously increasing. Discussions have emphasised strategies for securing the supply at the 
macro level, e.g. diversification in supply sources, increase in storage capacity, etc. By contrast, 
consumers’ demand for the reliability of gas supply is rarely investigated. Hence this study was 
conducted to examine the economic implications associated with the security of gas supply directly 
to domestic consumers. Based on the choice experiment approach, household surveys were 
conducted in France, Italy and the UK. The results confirmed that the degree of the economic 
impact of a disruption of gas supply to domestic consumers was a function of the duration of a 
supply disruption and the season in which a supply cut would take place, as well as other 
preferences of consumers. The willingness to pay to secure per unit of gas consumption, or 
alternatively the costs of gas unsupplied, was estimated at between €2.65/cubic metre and 
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The importance of security of natural gas supply has been widely noted by stakeholders of various 
backgrounds, including policy makers, energy companies, academic experts, etc. As Stern (2002) 
has put forward, the risks of having a gas supply disruptions in the future can be attributable to the 
following factors: the sources of gas supplies, the transit of gas supplies and the facilities through 
which gas is delivered. The risk with facilities lies in the situation that a network does not offer 
sufficient redundancy of capacity to allow for the redirection of flows in the event of the failure of a 
major component. This is thought to be the case for the current European pipeline networks, as well 
as for many national networks, e.g. in the UK. Whilst the EU’s energy policy is largely established 
on the prerequisite towards liberalised markets, keeping redundant capacity has become costly for 
energy suppliers and this is inevitably putting the supply of natural gas in greater risks. In 
comparison, risks associated with source and transit dependence are largely political in nature 
(Luciani, 2004). Luciani (2004) has also suggested that the only event that may precipitate a critical 
situation for the security of European gas supplies is the total interruption of supplies from Russia 
which is the largest supplier of gas to the EU. Besides, regional instability can have a significant 
impact on the sustainability of an established cross-national pipeline transit route.  
 
Actions that can reduce the threats associated with these risk factors will need to be taken in order 
to: 1) address, in the long term, the issues of supply adequacy, infrastructure required to deliver the 
supply to the market, and catastrophic failure of major supply sources and facilities, and 2) ensure, 
in the short run, supply availability and operational security of gas markets, e.g. daily and seasonal 
stress and strains of extreme weather (Stern, 2002). Potential solutions are available and many of 
them are gradually being put in place: for example, developing LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) 
technology has the advantage of diversifying supply sources and transit routes; storage obligation 
and emergency supply rights are considered in order to overcome short-term stress in the market 
(Cayrade, 2004). Yet the costs of implementing any of these measures will eventually be passed on 
to final consumers, and at the same time, energy markets in the EU countries are moving towards a 
deregulated framework in which energy companies require an adequate incentive structure to 
maintain high service reliability. From this viewpoint, the extent to which consumers demand the 
reliability of natural gas supply, expressed in monetary terms, provides essential and valuable 
inferences regarding the plausibility of undertaking any of these investment measures. In addition, it 
is also important for policy makers to be informed of consumers’ valuation on the reliability of gas 
supply in the future, so that an acceptable mix of regulatory and economic tools can be applied to 
maintain adequate security of supply that are socially optimal and economically efficient.  
 
Studies that have investigated the economic impacts of a gas supply disruption are very rare. In the 
report prepared for the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK in 2007 (Oxera, 2007), the 
costs of a gas outages were measured as the gross value added (GVA) lost due to an interruption on 
industry users only. The average cost due to an outage was estimated at £5/therm
2 or €17/cubic 
metre
3 and for large interruptions, the marginal cost may be above £30/therm (€102/cubic metre). 
The other illustration of measuring the value of a secure gas supply at the national level can be seen 
in Damigos, Tourkolias and Diakoulaki (2009). This study measured households’ willingness to 
pay to have reliable natural gas supply in electricity generation, rather than the natural gas supply 
directly to domestic consumers. The findings showed that Greek households were willing to pay 
€4.1- €11.8 on top of their bi-monthly electricity bills. Considering these estimates together with the 
total number of households in Greece and the country’s total annual electricity production from 
                                                 
2 This figure was obtained across a range of outages from 10mcm/day to 90mcm/day. 1 therm = 0.36 cubic metre 
natural gas. 
31€ = 0.796£ (2008£).   4
natural gas, the results indicated that households were willing to pay a premium between €4.5 and 
€12.7 per MWh, approximately equivalent to €0.05-0.14 / cubic metre
4.           
 
Natural gas is a growingly important source of energy supply to people’s houses, in which it is 
mainly used for room heating, water heating and/or cooking. The share of gas energy consumption 
of households of the total gas energy consumption has been rising in the last decade. As shown in 
Figure 1, the figure is over 60% for the UK and over 40% for both France and Italy. Despite 
showing a high reliance on gas supply, the domestic sector, however, is the most vulnerable group 
amongst all types of consumers. This is because industry users usually have the capacity of 
negotiating with energy suppliers a contract in which the reliability of supply, by and large, can be 
guaranteed at a predefined level and these users, in the same time, have back-up facilities in case of 
a supply disruption. By contrast, this is rarely the case seen amongst domestic users.  
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This study sets out to investigate domestic consumers’ valuation on the security of natural gas 
supply directly to their dwellings. To our best knowledge, this is the first study to value households’ 
willingness to pay for the reliability of gas supply to their homes at the national level as well as 
across various EU countries. The choice experiment method is employed and 725 households in 
total from three different European countries are interviewed. The countries of study include France, 
Italy and the UK.  
 
The data and the details related to the design of experiment are displayed in section 2. Section 3 
presents the econometric model used for estimation. We present and discuss the estimated outcomes 






                                                 
4 1 cubic metre natural gas= 11.06 kWh.   5
2. DATA AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Data based on the choice experiment approach was collected via surveys, in which respondents 
were asked to complete a few pre-designed experiments. Main surveys were carried out in late 
March and April of the year 2010 in France, Italy and the UK
5, by using computer assistant 
personal interviewing (CAPI). The raw data included 303 households (heads of household) in the 
UK, 222 in Italy and 200 in France
6. 
 
The choice instruments were designed as forced choice exercises. In a forced choice exercise, an 
opt-out option (usually a status quo option) is not available and therefore respondents must choose 
one out of the available alternatives and every alternative option has a price tag other than zero. 
This is considered as a suitable approach to apply when the trade-off effects amongst attributes are 
of higher interest to analysts than the aggregate effects across alternatives. We adopted this design 
in consideration of the following. First there is no reason to believe that a realistic status quo can be 
developed, as far as the reliability of gas supply is concerned. The current level of reliability in a 
country is an outcome of continuous private investments and policy inputs for a certain period of 
time, and the level will not be sustained in the future if private investment or policy instructions are 
not in place. Hence it is more appropriate to treat the level of reliability in the future as a random 
event to be determined by several changeable factors, rather than to assume the current situation 
will certainly carry on to the time to come. Moreover, the implied property rights are with the 
network companies, i.e. people have to pay to have the supply of natural gas to their homes, as well 
as to have more stable supply. Hence an opt-out option is unrealistic. (Hensher, Shore and Train, 
2005; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008) 
 
This study considered the following attributes to define the reliability of gas supply to people’s 
homes: the frequency of disruptions over a period of 5 years, the duration of one disruption and the 
seasons in which one supply cut takes place. We acknowledge that up to now the occurrence of 
disruptions of gas supply to people’s homes has been rather rare and the nature of a supply cut is 
distinct itself in that one occurrence usually lasts for some hours or at most days. Although it is not 
as common to have an unscheduled gas disruption as to have an unplanned power cut, the impacts 
of a unplanned gas outage can be substantial, particularly when households are increasingly relying 
on gas in their daily life for the purposes of cooking and/or heating. The details of the attribute 
levels are illustrated in Table 1. Note that the only differences in the attribute levels across the three 
countries exist in the attribute of price tag and this closely corresponds to the variations in 
households’ average gas bills across the three nations.  
 
Table 1: Levels of attributes 
Attributes  Levels over a period of 5 years 
April-September    
Number of 1-day disruption without warning  0; 1; 2 
Number of 3-day disruption without warning  0; 1; 2 
                                                 
5 Although the selected countries are not representative of the EU as a whole, it is believed that the results can offer 
useful implications to the policy making process at the EU level, in addition to that at the national level.    
6 The study looked at, in addition to gas supply, two other types of energy supply, i.e. electricity and transport fuels, on 
the same sample groups. Each of the whole interviews lasted approximately for 30-40 minutes. Each respondent was 
asked to complete a questionnaire that contained the following sections. Section A asked one’s experience in the 
reliability of electricity supply in their home, the use of electricity in one’s home, one’s subjective expectation on the 
risk of having less reliable supply in the future, etc. In addition, respondents were asked to complete different choice 
exercises. Section B and C were set out in a similar style with section A but regarding supply of natural gas and 
transport fuels, respectively.  
   6
October-March   
Number of 1-day disruption without warning  0; 1; 2 
Number of 1-day disruption with warning   0; 1; 2 
Number of 3-day disruption without warning   0; 1; 2 
Annual back-up equipment connection fee 
€17; €34; €51; €68; €85 (France) 
€24; €48; €72; €96; €120 (Italy) 
£17; £34; £51; £68; £85 (UK) 
 
 
One choice card contains two choice situations/options. Drawing upon Louviere et al. (2000), we 
firstly applied a fractional factorial design to obtain the first choice option in each choice set and 
then based on Street, Burgess and Louviere (2005), we constructed the corresponding second choice 
option for each set. Before a respondent carried out the choice experiment, he/she was asked to read 
carefully a paragraph that addressed the potential risk factors that can reduce the reliability of gas 
supply in the surveyed country, as well as the solutions to reduce the risk. This paragraph was 
provided in order to help respondents understand more about the topic of supply security about 
which, we consider, people in general have limited knowledge. In sequence, choice experiments are 
then set out with a hypothetical situation as below: 
 
 ‘Imagine that from now on, there is a possibility of choosing different contracts with your gas 
supplier and that back-up equipment exists to provide gas to your house in case of a gas supply 
disruption. The reliability of natural gas supply - number of disruptions in various lengths - which 
your household will experience can be guaranteed by connecting to this back-up equipment. You 
have to pay a connection fee on top of your usual gas bills to your gas supplier in order to have this 
back-up equipment. The annual fee will be payable as a lump sum or on a monthly basis. Note that 
it is impossible to guarantee no supply interruptions. Please tell us for each of the following cards, 
which single contract between the two would you prefer?  
 
A card example used in the UK survey is shown in Figure 2 as an illustration: 
 
  Number of interruptions over a period of 5 years 
Forms of interruptions  Contract A  Contract B 
April –September     
  1 day interruption without warning   1  2 
  3 day interruption without warning  0  1 
October-March     
  1 day interruption without warning   1  2 
  1 day interruption with warning  2  0 
  3 day interruption without warning  0  1 
ANNUAL connection fee to the back-up equipment  £85 
(£7.08 per month) 
£51 
(£4.25 per month) 
Figure 2: An example of a choice card for the case of gas supply (UK) 
 
Each respondent in the UK was required to complete four different choice exercises, each of which 
containing two options, and respondents in Italy and France were asked to complete 16 choice 
exercises
7. In the questionnaire, we asked respondents about their experience of the use of gas 
                                                 
7  This was a misconduct occurring in the process of data collection. It was reasonable to suspect that having 16 
exercises may have caused cognitive stress of respondents and could have reduced the credibility of the data. However, 
eventually we are not concerned with this issue in that: 1) according to interviewers’ report on the level of annoyance of 
respondents, ranging from ‘1’ not annoyed at all to ‘5’very annoyed, the average level of annoyance of the sample for   7
supply in their homes, their expectation on the level of reliability of gas supply in the future, their 
attitudes towards some contextual statements related to gas supply and their socio-economic 
backgrounds.  
 
As shown in Table 2, only a very small percentage of our respondents have experienced an 
unplanned disruption of gas supply in the past 12 months, ranging from 2% in the UK to 7% in Italy. 
The dependence on gas supply is seen to be higher during October and March than during April and 
September. Amongst the three countries, France reports the lowest level of dependence during the 
cold months, whereas Italy and the UK demonstrated significantly high level of dependence. As far 
as the level of satisfaction with the current reliability of supply is concerned, the average is above 4 
for all the three countries, suggesting that respondents in general are satisfied with the current gas 
supply to their homes. It is generally observed that the percentage of respondents with back-up 
facilities ranges between 21% in Italy and 40% in France. At last, on average respondents consider 
it to be unlikely that they will experience more frequent supply disruptions in the near-term and the 
long-term future, according to the figures ranging between 2.65 and 3.02. This suggests that 
respondents’ expectation on the risk of having a poorer reliability of supply in the future is 





Table 2:  Experience of natural gas service and expectation on the reliability in the future 
  UK France Italy 
Experienced disruptions of supply in the past 12 months, without advanced warning (% of the 
sample)  2 5 7 
Average dependence on gas supply (‘1’ very low to ‘5’ very high)        
     During April and September  3.20  3.21  3.34 
     During October and the following March  4.49  3.69  4.48 
The average level of satisfaction with the reliability of the current gas supply (‘1’ very 
dissatisfied to ‘5’ very satisfied)   4.54 4.10 4.23 
Have back-up facilities at home (% of the sample)  35  40  21 
Expectation of having more frequent supply disruption than now       
    In the short-term (‘1’ very unlikely to ‘5’ very likely)  2.65  2.72  2.99 
    In the long-term (‘1’ very unlikely to ‘5’ very likely)  2.94  2.89  3.02 
 
 
Table 3 illustrates respondents’ opinions/attitudes towards some statements related to the issue of 
gas supply. In general, most of the respondents strongly agreed that it is important to have reliable 
gas supply, particularly in the UK and Italy. More than half of the respondents in Italy have recently 
read/heard about the risk of disruption to the natural gas supply in the future, whereas more than 
60% of the UK respondents reported the opposite. Although gas disruptions have been rather rare 
up to now, some respondents expressed that they would like to have more reliable gas supply and 
this proportion accounted for 70% of the total respondents in Italy, and slightly less than 50% for 
the UK and France. Finally, there is a high fraction of respondents that would object to paying extra 
money for an improvement in the reliability of gas supply, ranging from 75% in France to more 
than 90% in Italy.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
both Italy and France was less than 2; 2) each exercise was in a two-option design, which was considered simple to 
choose from.        8
 
Table 3: Other contextual information  
  France 
  Agree Neither  agree  nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Reliable gas supply is important.  77.8%  16.2%  5.9% 
I have recently read/heard about the risk of disruption to the natural gas 
supply in the future.  33.5% 25.4%  41.1% 
I would like to have a more reliable gas supply.  44.3%  43.2%  12.4% 
Power companies should pay for improvements in the reliability of natural 
gas supply without passing this cost to their customers.  84.9% 14.1%  1.1% 
I object to paying extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural 
gas supply.  75.1% 18.4%  6.5% 
  Italy 
  Agree  Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Reliable gas supply is important.  93%  7%  0% 
I have recently read/heard about the risk of disruption to the natural gas 
supply in the future.  58.1% 26.1%  15.8% 
I would like to have a more reliable gas supply.  69%  23.4%  7.6% 
Power companies should pay for improvements in the reliability of natural 
gas supply without passing this cost to their customers.  85.3% 13%  1.6% 
I object to paying extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural 
gas supply.  90.7% 5.5%  3.8% 
  UK 
  Agree  Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Reliable gas supply is important.  99.2%  0.8%  0% 
I have recently read/heard about the risk of disruption to the natural gas 
supply in the future.  30.7% 8.7%  60.6% 
I would like to have a more reliable gas supply.  49.8%  34%  16.2% 
Power companies should pay for improvements in the reliability of natural 
gas supply without passing this cost to their customers.  94.6% 3.7%  1.7% 
I object to paying extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural 
gas supply.  89.2% 6.6%  4.1% 
 
 
Table 4 - Table 6 show the composition of the sample sets in terms of respondents’ socio-economic 
and geographic characteristics, by country. As shown, the sample in each country has an even 
distribution across different geographical regions, as well as several socio-economic groups of 
gender, age and educational attainment. The only noticeable differences are that: 1) compared to the 
British sample or the Italian sample, the French one has a smaller portion of respondents who 
reported to have the experience of working in the energy-related industry; 2) the share of 
households with children at home in the British sample outnumbers that in the samples of the other 
two countries. Note that in the next stage, respondents’ demographic backgrounds will enter the 
choice modelling analysis as control variables.       9
 
 
Table 4: Demographic breakdown of the sample (France) 
Residential area   
    North
8 32.4% 
    Paris
9 23.2% 
    West
10 11.4% 
    Southwest
11 15.7% 
    Central south
12 17.3% 
Age   
   18-24  17.3% 
   25-34  18.9% 
   35-44  16.2% 
   45-54  17.3% 
   55-64  15.7% 
   65 and above  14.6% 
Gender   
   Male  43.8% 
   Female  56.2% 
Education   
   With university degree  18.9% 
   College  18.9% 
   Normal and technical high school   29.2% 
   Professional  23.8% 
   With no qualification  9.2% 
With children at home  21.6% 
With elderly members at home  15.7% 
Experience of working in the energy industry  3.8% 
 
Table 5: Demographic breakdown of the sample (Italy) 
Residential area   
    North
13 39.7% 
    Central
14 23.4% 
    Central south
15 37.0% 
Age   
   18-24  10.9% 
   25-34  19.6% 
   35-44  20.1% 
   45-54  21.2% 
   55-64  16.8% 
   65 and above  11.4% 
Gender   
   Male  49.5% 
   Female  50.5% 
                                                 
8 Areas with postcodes starting with 02, 62, 59 and 80 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/2_digit_postcode_france.png 
9 Areas with postcodes starting with 75, 92 and 94 
10 Areas with postcodes starting with 37 
11 Areas with postcodes starting with 24,33,40 and 64 
12 Areas with postcodes starting with 63 and 69 
13 Regions of Piedmont, Lombardy and Veneto 
14 Regions of Tuscany, Umbria and Latium 
15 Regions of Molise, Campania and Apulia   10
Education   
   First degree or above  28.8% 
   A level or equivalents  51.1% 
   GCSE or equivalents  9.2% 
   Below GCSE   10.9% 
With children at home  32.6% 
With elderly members at home  17.4% 
Experience of working in the energy industry  9.2% 
 
Table 6: Demographic breakdown of the sample (UK) 
Residential area   
   Scotland  32.0% 
   North Ireland  16.2% 
   Wales  2.5% 
   North England  24.9% 
   Midlands  11.2% 
   South England  13.3% 
Age   
   18-24  15.4% 
   25-34  22.4% 
   35-44  19.9% 
   45-54  14.5% 
   55-64  14.9% 
   65 and above  12.9% 
Gender   
   Male  47.3% 
   Female  52.7% 
Education   
   First degree or above  25.3% 
   A level or equivalents  21.2% 
   GCSE or equivalents  42.7% 
   No qualification  10.8% 
With children at home  43.2% 
With elderly members at home  14.1% 
Experience of working in the energy industry  9.1% 
 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
We consider a conditional logit model for data analysis. A sampled individual i faces a choice 
amongst  J alternatives, in each of the choice situations (i.e. choice cards, in practice) that are 
presented to him/her. He/she is assumed to consider the full set of offered alternatives in choice 
card and to choose the alternative that provides him/her with the highest utility. The utility 
associated with each alternative j , as evaluated by each individual i   in each choice card, is 
represented in a discrete choice model by a expression of general form shown as follows:   
 
U (choice  j for individual i) = = ij U ij i j ij z x ε γ β + ′ + ′ ,  J j ,..., 1 = .    (1) 
 
The utility functions as specified are conditioned on the attributes of the choices,  ij x  , and observed 
individuals’ choice invariant characteristics,  i z . β , γ  are vectors of unknown parameters. Within   11
the logit context,  ij ε  is assumed to be independently distributed across the utilities (Independence 
from Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA), each with the same type 1 extreme value distribution, i.e. the 
error components of different alternatives within a choice card are set to be uncorrelated.  
 
The probability of individual ichoosing alternative  j in a given choice situation is logit and can be 
written as the following closed form:  
 















,         ( 2 )  
where  i y  is the index of the choice made.   
 
The estimation is carried out by using the method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), and 
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in which  ij d  takes on a value of 1 if individual i chooses  j, 0 otherwise.   
 
In our unlabelled choice model, the average unobserved effects for all alternatives are constrained 
to be zero during the estimation process. Also, to estimate the parameters for the socioeconomic and 
contextual variables that only change across individuals but not within a single choice set requires 
us to create interaction terms for each of these variables with specific attributes in order for the 
model to be correctly specified. (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 2005)  
 
With respect to explanatory variables, we consider, in addition to the effects of attributes, 
respondents’ individual characteristics, including their socio-economic backgrounds, residential 
areas and their reported attitudes towards different contextual information associated with the topic 
of gas supply. In order to compare the results of the three different countries, we adopt as much 
similar sets of background variables as possible across the three different countries. They include: 1) 
whether or not respondents have vulnerable habitants in their households, i.e. children under age 18 
and elderly people aged 65 or above; 2) working experience of respondents in energy-related 
industry; 3) household income level; 4) residential regions; 5) strategic voting behaviour, i.e. 
objection to pay.     
 
Amongst the variables of use, we incurred a problem of missing observations of household income, 
consisting of 40% of the UK raw data and 35% for the Italian and French data, respectively. This 
can be because income level was considered a sensitive piece of information by respondents who 
therefore were reluctant to reveal it. In response to the issue of large amount of missing data, we 
applied an ordered probit model to regress households’ observed income levels, in an ordered form, 
on their observable characteristics, including their heads’ gender, educational level, age, marital 
status, whether working or not, the number of adult member in the family, the number of its family 
members and its residential regions. As a result we obtained a fitted income level observation for 
each of the households in the sample.   
 
The willingness to pay (WTP) in this study is considered as the annual value of one occurrence of 
supply disruption avoided over a period of 5 year, and can be calculated as follows: 







= ,            ( 4 )  
 
where  attri β ˆ  denotes the estimated coefficient of one of the attributes representing the number of 










Table 7 reports the final estimation results for France. It is shown that only the estimated 
coefficients of the frequency attributes during cold months are significant at the 95% confidence 
level. Comparing the coefficient of 1-day cuts without warning (-0.096) to that of 1-day cuts with 
warning (-0.074) revealsthat an advanced warning before a 1-day supply cut occurs would decrease 
the impacts on households. By contrast, results show that French households are not willing to pay 
to avoid a 3-day cut during cold months
16. Whilst this appears rather unreasonable in the first place, 
one explanation for this can be that interviewees, based on their experience
17, consider the chance 
of having 3-day cuts in the future to be negligible. Moreover, as shown previously in Table 2, 
French respondents on average, compared to those in the other two countries, reported a lower level 
of dependence on gas supply and lower risk expectation of the deterioration in the stability of 
supply; also, 40% of French respondents have back-up facilities in case of a gas cut, whereas it was 
only 21% for Italy and 35% for the UK. The estimated positive utility associated with a 3-day cut 
does not at all suggest that households will receive no negative impacts if an event as such takes 
place; rather, French respondents did not think such events would take place in the future, and 
hence on average expressed no concern. This is the difference between stakeholders’, i.e. domestic 
consumers’ perception of a problem and the reality of its occurrence. 
 
We examined the effect of heterogeneity in respondents’ characteristics on their valuation on the 
reliability of gas supply. For example, respondents with at least a child
18 at home are more willing 
to pay to avoid a long cut during cold months, than those without. 3.8% of the sample respondents 
reported to have the experience of working in the energy-related industry, and this background 
(considered as a dummy variable) was found to be associated with higher willingness to pay to 
avoid a 3-day supply cut.  
 
Residential regions are found to have an effect on respondents’ choices of reliability of supply and 
climatic differences are considered one of the explanations for this. When geographic dummies are 
considered together with the attribute of 3-day cuts during colder months, the estimation results 
show that respondents in the south west region of France display, compared to those in Paris, the 
least level of willingness to pay to avoid 3-day cuts. Respondents living in the west or north region 
of France are, by contrast, more willing to pay to avoid such an event. . The explanation is that it is 
cold enough in the north in winter time so that heating is necessary, but not in the south. 
                                                 
16 Note that in a model in which only attributes were considered, the coefficient was insignificant at the 90% confidence 
level.  
17 It is believed that most of the interviewees have not experienced a 3-day disruption of the gas supply.    
18 Aged under 18.   13
 
Previously we have demonstrated the extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed with certain 
contextual statements. Strategic voting effect is controlled in this model, as demonstrated by the 
interaction term between cost and whether people are against paying for an improvement in the 
reliability of gas supply. Results confirmed that respondents who reported an objection avoided 
paying higher fees, more than their counterparts.  
      
 
Table 7:  Estimation results for France 
Conditional logit model    
Explanatory variables  Coefficients 
During April-September   
    1-day cuts, no warning  -0.0003 
(0.036) 
    3-day cuts, no warning  0.043 
(0.053) 
During October-March   
   1-day cuts, no warning  -0.096** 
(0.038) 
   1-day cuts, with warning   -0.074** 
(0.034) 
   3-day cuts, no warning  0.439*** 
(0.131) 
Annual cost  -0.03*** 
(0.003) 
Other explanatory variables   
CHILD *  3-day cuts during October-March  -0.327*** 
(0.105) 
Working in energy industry * 3-day cuts during October-March  -0.865*** 
(0.211) 
Geographic dummies * 3-day cuts during October – March (base: PARIS )   
   NORTH   -0.677*** 
(0.127) 
   WEST  -1.927*** 
(0.159) 
   SOUTH WEST  0.366** 
(0.174) 
   CENTRAL SOUTH  -0.281* 
(0.155) 
Object to pay extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural gas supply * 
Cost (base: neither agree or disagree)   
   Agree   -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
   Disagree  -0.003 
(0.004) 
Observations  2960 





Estimation results are shown in Table 8. A positive willingness to pay to avoid a 1-day cut during 
the warm months as well as during the cold months may imply high dependence of households on 
gas supply for cooking and this can, to some extent, explain why gas supply is considered essential 
during warm month. By contrast, such consistency does not appear between the case of a 3-day cut 
during warm months and that during cold months. This leads us to consider two possible 
explanations for people’s being not willing to pay to avoid a long cut during warm months. First,   14
respondents may think that having a long cut during low-demand seasons is unlikely. Second, there 
are other solutions during April and September apart from paying higher bills for securing the 
reliability, such as going somewhere else for a short holiday.       
 
We further consider the effects of respondents’ characteristics on their attitudes towards long cuts 
during cold months. It is found that respondents with higher household income, with a working 
experience in energy-related industry or with elderly people at home, are more willing to avoid a 
long cut, than their counterpart. Respondents’ residential regions appear influential on their 
willingness to pay to avoid a long cut; however, these effects, we consider, do not rise completely 
as a result of the climate. For example, when compared with those living in the central region of 
Italy, people living in the colder area, such as the north, are less willing to pay to avoid a long cut 
during the cold months.   
 
Finally, the effect of strategic voting behaviour is examined together with the attribute ‘annual cost’. 
The results confirmed that those who would object to pay extra money for an improvement in 
reliability of natural gas supply tend to prefer options with lower prices, and those who would not 




Table 8:   Estimation results for Italy 
Conditional logit model   
Explanatory variables  Coefficients 
During April-September   
    1-day cuts, no warning  -0.070** 
(0.034) 
    3-day cuts, no warning  0.035 
(0.050) 
During October-March   
   1-day cuts, no warning  -0.072** 
(0.035) 
   1-day cuts, with warning   -0.055* 
(0.031) 
   3-day cuts, no warning  -0.528*** 
(0.123) 
Annual cost  -0.007*** 
(0.003) 
Other explanatory variables   
INCOME *  3-day cuts during October-March  -0.153*** 
(0.049) 
Working in energy industry * 3-day cuts during October-March 
-0.857*** 
(0.130) 
ELDERLY * 3-day cuts during October-March  -0.164*** 
(0.055) 
Geographic dummies * 3-day cuts during October – March (base: CENTRAL )   
   NORTH   1.158*** 
(0.118) 
   CENTRAL SOUTH  0.952*** 
(0.105) 
Object to pay extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural gas supply * 
Cost (base: neither agree or disagree)   
   Agree   -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
   Disagree  0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Observations  2944   15
Log likelihood  -1702.08 
 
 
4.3 United Kingdom 
 
Table 9 reports the estimation results for the UK. The results indicate that respondents in the UK 
are only willing to pay to avoid a 3-day during cold months, at the 90% confidence level, but are 
not willing to pay for other types of cuts specified in this study. These results tell us that if a gas 
disruption lasts for only a day or if even for three days but in warm months, the negative impact 
associated with one supply cut, on average, is not significant in the UK.   
 
People having higher household income tend to be more willing to pay to avoid one such cut, 
compared to their counterparts, as shown by the interaction variable of households’ income variable, 
INCOME, and the attribute of 1-day cut in warm months. However, different from the findings in 
the other two countries, UK households with at least a child at home are less willing to pay to avoid 
a 3-day supply disruption in the cold months than those without, according to the results. To search 
possible explanations for this result, we looked further into other characteristics of these two groups 
of respondents. We then found that: 1) on average, respondents with children reported lower, 
although not much, level of reliance on gas supply, both in warm and cold months, than those 
without; 2) also, respondents with children, on average, use gas supply for fewer types of purposes, 
such as heating, cooking, etc, than their counterparts.   
 
Respondents’ residential regions are found to be related to their willingness to pay to avoid a long 
cut during cold months, but the results do not suggest a climate-related cause. This is because those 
living in Scotland, a place considered being colder than south England, demonstrate lower 
willingness to pay to avoid a 3-day cut, than their southern counterparts. The expectation for the 
future may be one explanation, as it is found that respondents in Scotland have lower risk 
expectation of having a less reliable gas supply both in the long term and in the short term, than 
those in south England, hence lower willingness to pay for a long cut.     
 
Finally, strategic voting effect is observed but not strongly evident, as we find that respondents who 
would object to pay for an improvement in the reliability of supply appear more likely to choose 
options with lower prices.  
 
 
Table 9: Estimation results for the UK 
Conditional logit model   
Explanatory variables  Coefficients 
During April-September   
    1-day cuts, no warning  -0.066 
(0.088) 
    3-day cuts, no warning  0.031 
(0.094) 
During October-March   
   1-day cuts, no warning  -0.093 
(0.057) 
   1-day cuts, with warning   -0.054 
(0.056) 
   3-day cuts, no warning  -0.347* 
(0.200) 
Annual cost  -0.018*** 
(0.007) 
Other explanatory variables   
INCOME * 1-day cuts during April – September  -0.191***   16
(0.074) 
CHILD * 3-day cuts during October – March  0.290** 
(0.138) 
Geographic dummies * 3-day cuts during October - March (base: SOUTH 
ENGLAND)   
    SCOTLAND  0.766*** 
(0.153) 
   NORTH IRELAND  -0.157 
(0.166) 
   WALES  -0.594* 
(0.360) 
   NORTH ENGLAND  -0.093 
(0.141) 
   MIDLANDS   -0.307* 
(0.177) 
Working in energy industry * 3-day cuts during October-March  -0.456* 
(0.234) 
Object to paying extra money for an improvement in reliability of natural gas supply
 
* Cost (base level: neither agree nor disagree)   
   Agree  -0.007* 
(0.004) 
   Disagree  0.005 
(0.007) 
Observations  964 




4.4 Willingness to pay to avoid a supply disruption 
 
Table 10 reports the estimated values of willingness to pay to avoid supply disruptions of various 
characteristics. The value of the willingness to pay to avoid supply cuts during warm months over a 
period of 5 years is evident amongst Italian households and estimated at €10/household/year. 
During cold months, respondents in both France and Italy are found willing to pay between €3.20 
and €10.29/household/year, respectively, to avoid a 1-day cut without warning. In comparison, the 
WTP for a 1-day cut with warning is estimated at €2.47 and €7.86, respectively, and these estimates 
are approximately 77% of the previous WTP estimates associated with cuts without warning. 
Finally, we obtained various evidences about the magnitude of the willingness to pay to avoid a 3-
day cut during cold months across the three countries, ranging from a negative value -€14.63 for 
France and positive ones for the UK (€24.22) and Italy (€75.43). When comparing UK to Italy, we 
find that the WTP of Italian respondents are willing to pay three times as much as their counterparts 
in the UK. The findings overall confirm that a supply cut during cold months would have higher 
impact than one during warm months. In addition, the scale of such impact would increase non-
linearly with the duration of a cut, as suggested by the findings in the UK and Italy. French 
households’ negative WTP to avoid a 3-day supply disruption points out that: 1) if this figure were 
to be considered as an indicator of the potential welfare benefits of making further investment to 
reduce the risk of a 3-day supply disruption in France, the magnitude of benefits would be 
considerably underestimated; 2) if the undervalued WTP is as a result of households perceiving the 
risk of having a 3-day supply disruption to be trivial, French consumers, as a consequence of being 
less alert, can be more prone to the impacts of a long supply cut than their counterparts in Italy and 
the UK.    
  
 
Table 10: Marginal Willingness to Pay to avoid a supply disruption over a period of 5 years 
  Annual WTP (2008 £/€)   17
  UK (£/€)  France  (€)  Italy  (€) 
During April-September       
    A 1-day cut, no warning  0  0  10.00 
    A 3-day cut, no warning  0  0  0 
During October-March       
   A 1-day cut, no warning  0  3.20   10.29 
   A 1-day cut, with warning   0  2.47   7.86 
   A 3-day cut, no warning  19.28/24.22
§ -14.63
19   75.43 
*‘0’ represents statistically insignificant results at the 10% significance level. 
§ 1€ = 0.796 £  
 
To measure the WTP per unit of gas, we firstly obtained the average annual gas consumption per 
domestic consumer over the period of 2005-2009 in Great Britain, which was 17433 kWh/per 
household, higher than this in Scotland and lower in south England. Therefore, the derived daily 
consumption is approximately 48 kWh/per household. Considering the seasonal demand factors
20, 
the adjusted daily gas consumption is estimated at 57 kWh/per household during the months from 
October to March, and at 39 kWh/per household during the rest of the months (from April to 
September). Therefore a 3-day gas outage to a household during cold months would mean that 171 
kWh of natural gas is not delivered. Using the discount rate of 3%, the present value of the 
aggregate WTP per household to avoid a 3-day cut, over a period of 5 years, is approximately £91 
or €114. Hence the WTP to secure a unit of gas consumption is £0.53 or €0.67/kWh, equivalent to 
£5.86 or €7.41/cubic metre (2008£/€), in the UK. The aggregate WTP of domestic users
21 to avoid a 
3-day gas outage during cold months would be £2.05 million or €2.57 billion. Domestic users’ total 
expenditure on gas over 5 years is estimated at £59.01 billion, based on the average gas price of 
£0.03/kWh
22 and the average annual gas consumption as stated above (2008£). Considering WTP 
(security premium) as a percentage of the total expenditure, we obtained a figure of 3.48%. 
 
In France, the gas consumption data from the EUROSTAT and from the Eurogas Statistics
23 
suggest that the average annual gas consumption is at around 15305 kWh/per household. 
Considering the proxy seasonal factors
24, the adjusted daily gas consumption is estimated at 48 
kWh/per household during the months from October to March, and at 36 kWh/per household during 
the rest of the months (from April to September). The WTP to secure a unit of gas consumption 
therefore ranges between €0.24 and €0.31/kWh (€2.65 - €3.43/cubic metre) during October and 
March, considering only the positive WTP estimates. The potential welfare impacts of a supply 
outage in winter can be reduced by €0.07/kWh (€0.77/cubic metre) as a result of a warning ahead of 
the disruption. The aggregate WTP of domestic users to avoid a 1-day gas outage during cold 
months would be €125.03 – €161.98 million (2008€) over a period of 5 years. This suggests that 
security premium as a percentage of households’ total expenditure on gas is between 0.35% and 
0.45% for France.  
 
In Italy, the average annual gas consumption is measured at 10554 kWh/per household, according 
to the data
25 from the EUROSTAT and the estimated number of households
26. Similar to the case of 
                                                 
19 Note that the negative value of WTP corresponds to the positive sign of the estimated coefficient of 0.439 shown in 
Table 7. 
20 We used the data of total monthly demand of natural gas between years 1998 and 2009 to obtain the average seasonal 
variation patterns across different months within a year.  http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Gas/Data/misc/ 
21 The number of the total domestic users was 22,567,500 in year 2009. http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Gas/Data/misc/ 
22 Average price of gas for domestic users between year 2005 and 2009, calculated based on data from EUROSTAT.  
23 The number of the total domestic users was approximately 10,731,000 at 1 January 2005 (Eurogas Statistics, 2004). 
Note that the number of domestic consumers in the most recent year, although not available, should exceed the figure 
provided above.    
24 The average indexes of monthly relative heating degree days during the period of 1998-2009 are used as the proxy 
seasonal factors.    
25 Of years 2005-2009   18
France, the adjusted daily gas consumption, considering the proxy seasonal factors, is estimated at 
32 kWh/per household during the months from October to March, and at 26 kWh/per household 
during the rest of the months (from April to September). Accordingly, the WTP to secure a unit of 
gas consumption is calculated at €1.81/kWh (€20.02/cubic metre) during April and September and 
at between €1.16 and €3.75/kWh (€12.83 - €41.48/cubic metre) during October and March. Note 
that this study also shows that the provision of an early warning before a supply disruption can 
reduce the impact of a supply outage on Italian households by approximately €0.36/kWh 
(€3.98/cubic metre). The aggregate WTP of domestic users to avoid a 3-day gas outage during cold 
months would be €6.63 billion (2008€) over a period of 5 years in Italy, or 15.68% of households’ 
total expenditure on gas, and that to avoid a 1-day gas outage would range between €689.4 and 





This study, applying a choice experiment approach, investigated the value of the reliability of gas 
supply to domestic users’ homes. Data was collected from three European countries: France, Italy 
and the UK, and this allowed us to scrutinise the similar or different preferences for the levels of 
energy security in national as well as EU contexts.   
 
The results of this study have shown that the degree of the economic impact of a disruption of gas 
supply to domestic consumers was subject to the duration and the season in which a supply cut 
would take place, as well as other preferences of consumers. It was also suggested that, by and large, 
consumers’ preferences for the level of supply reliability could vary from one country to another. 
For example, a disruption in warm months would likely have impact on Italian households, but this 
may not be the case for British or French households. Besides, British households may show a 
higher level of tolerance for having a 1-day disruption during cold months over a period of 5 years, 
than their French or Italian counterparts.  
  
The concept of willingness to pay in this study refers to the value of a supply cut avoided. The 
results of this study allow us to conclude that the marginal WTP to secure per unit of gas 
consumption is estimated at between €2.65/cubic metre and €41.48/cubic metre across three 
different European countries. Accordingly, security premium as a percentage of the gross 
expenditure on gas ranges between 0.35% and 15.68%. These figures, we propose, have important 
policy implication in that: 1) they correspond to the potential household welfare impact incurred as 
a result of gas outages; 2) they also can be considered as an indicator for the value/benefits of an 
improvement in supply reliability at the demand side, which can be compared against an investment 
plan which policy makers/energy suppliers may consider in order to secure a certain level of 
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26 The number of the total domestic users was approximately 18,631,700 in 2009.  (ISTAT, 2010)     19
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